Eternal Vigilance -- The Battle for the Michigan Supreme Court and the Rule of Law

Once again, we find ourselves on the brink of another Supreme Court election, again featuring a distinct contrast between rule-of-law judges and the so-called "empathy" judges.  On the rule-of-law side, we have Brian Zahra, David Viviano, and James Redford.  The principal empathy candidate is Richard Bernstein.

All elections and races are important, but as the final arbiters of what will and will not be constitutional or enforceable, there is no race more important than the race for Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court.

Bernstein's candidacy is summed up well here.

To underscore the importance of the rule of law, I am reposting a piece that can be found in its original form here.  It illustrates how empathy judges decide however they want to, without regard for the law, for private contracts, or any other limits.  Empathy judging is an extreme danger to society, since it eliminates any reasonable expectations of how others will behave. For example, if contracts don't mean what they say, how can we rely on them?  The lessons of this piece are just as applicable today as they were when it was first posted.

Putting "The Rule of Law" in Perspective

This year's Michigan Supreme Court election will spotlight the "Rule of Law" issue. Voters will be asked to decide between Justice Robert Young and Judge Mary Beth Kelly (the Rule of Law judges) and Justice Alton Davis and Judge Denise Langford Morris (the "empathy" judges).

Simply described, RoL judges interpret the constitution, laws, and contracts by the plain meaning of the words used by their authors. Empathy judges, in contrast, interpret the same words in order to reach a desired result.

Here's a perfect example -- Elizabeth Weaver's parting gift to Michigan jurisprudence. The case is Shay v Aldrich, decided August 23, 2010. In short, the plaintiff sued five defendants, alleging that they had assaulted him. Partway through the case, the plaintiff settled with two of the defendants and signed two separate releases, each releasing a defendant "together with all other persons, firms and corporations, from any and all claims, demands and actions which I have now or may have arising out of any and all damages, expenses, and any loss or damage resulting from an incident occurring on September 8, 2004."

After the plaintiff signed these releases, the other defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims, arguing that the plaintiff had waived them. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. finding the releases unambiguous. The Michigan Supreme Court then granted leave to appeal and reinstated the claims against the remaining defendants, finding in a 4-3 opinion by Weaver that the plaintiff did not intend -- despite the clear language of the releases -- to waive any claims against the remaining defendants. The Weaver opinion equated "broad" with "vague" and permits the parties to use extrinsic evidence to introduce ambiguities into a contract, thus necessitating "interpretation" where there previously was none.

The impact of this opinion will not be limited to releases. Why should it be? Why are releases to be treated differently from every other kind of contract? Under the new Weaver rule, a contract means what it was intended to mean, regardless of what it actually says. Under the rule of law, contracts mean what they say, without an interpretive middleman in a black robe.

This Weaverizing of contracts is symptomatic of the elitist arrogance of the ruling class -- they know better than you do what you need and what you really mean. It is this arrogance that leads to Congress passing 3,000 page bills it hasn't read, doesn't understand, and has no intention of reading or understanding. Government power is thereby transferred to the bureaucracy, and the people are left with no option but litigation, hence the constitutional challenge to Obamacare. If we don't have the courts, we are lost.

In the July-August 2010 issue of the American Spectator, Angelo Codevilla published a brilliant article, America's Ruling Class -- And the Perils of Revolution. Please read it here. He describes the ruling class as considering itself "saviors of the planet" and "improvers of humanity." It is a penetrating, brilliant article.

A portion of Codevilla's article describes the interaction between the ruling class and the courts:

Disregard for the text of laws -- for the dictionary meaning of words and the intentions of those who wrote them -- in favor of the decider's discretion has permeated our ruling class from the Supreme Court to the lowest local agency. Ever since Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in 1920 (Missouri v. Holland) that presidents, Congresses, and judges could not be bound by the U.S. Constitution regarding matters that the people who wrote and ratified it could not have foreseen, it has become conventional wisdom among our ruling class that they may transcend the Constitution while pretending allegiance to it. They began by stretching such constitutional terms as "interstate commerce" and "due process," then transmuting others, e.g., "search and seizure," into "privacy." Thus in 1973 the Supreme Court endowed its invention of "privacy" with a "penumbra" that it deemed "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The court gave no other constitutional reasoning, period. Perfunctory to the point of mockery, this constitutional talk was to reassure the American people that the ruling class was acting within the Constitution's limitations. By the 1990s federal courts were invalidating amendments to state constitutions passed by referenda to secure the "positive rights" they invent, because these expressions of popular will were inconsistent with the constitution they themselves were construing.

By 2010 some in the ruling class felt confident enough to dispense with the charade. Asked what in the Constitution allows Congress and the president to force every American to purchase health insurance, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi replied: "Are you serious? Are you serious?" No surprise then that lower court judges and bureaucrats take liberties with laws, regulations, and contracts. That is why legal words that say you are in the right avail you less in today's America than being on the right side of the persons who decide what they want those words to mean.

As the discretionary powers of officeholders and of their informal entourages have grown, the importance of policy and of law itself is declining, citizenship is becoming vestigial, and the American people become ever more dependent.

So, the battle for the Michigan Supreme Court is not merely a contest for control of the Supreme Court. It is a fight to regain some measure of the rule of law, to maintain a bulwark against the whims of the ruling class and government bureaucracies, and, perhaps most importantly, to assert our independence as free citizens.

If we don't have the authority to govern our own affairs through written agreements, what is left for us?

Don't Get Your Panties in a Bunch -- It's Not Personal

Is it impossible these days to have a discussion about an issue or a political race without it becoming personal?  Apparently so, at least for one backer of Judge Jane Markey.

Markey is up against Colleen O'Brien for one of three Republican nominations for Michigan Supreme Court justice.  As faithful readers of this blog know, your Wizard has published three articles critical of Markey decisions, principally on the grounds that they contradict her claim to be a "rule of law" judge.  I have never attacked Judge Markey personally, nor have I attacked her supporters.

But they have attacked me personally.

The latest attack was purportedly authored by one Steven Vander Ark in an email distributed to the delegates to this weekend's Republican convention.  He says that I practice "the dark art of magic - turning fiction into fact while hiding behind the curtain of anonymity. Any lawyer reviewing his 'analysis' of Markey's decisions would recognize a straight up hatchet job: it is no wonder he wants to remain anonymous. His blog is a shameful sham set up for the sole purpose of producing political smears under the guise of legal analysis."  He goes on to criticize my discussion of the Wilkie case and my quoting of the Chief Justice in the Progressive Insurance case.

You know, if you're going to lie about me, at least tell the truth while doing it.

Here's where Mr. Vander Ark and the truth part company:

1.  This blog was established in 2007; it was not "set up for the sole purpose of producing political smears under the guise of legal analysis." 

2.  I never discussed the Wilkie case, and I do not consider a reversal as any reason not to vote for a judge.  As a judge whom I respect frequently says, "Even when the court of appeals affirms me, I still think I'm right."  I have never criticized Judge Markey or any other judge because one of their decisions was reversed.  My posts on Judge Markey may be reviewed here, here, and here.

3.  Mr. Vander Ark is correct that I quoted the Chief Justice in my discussion of the Progressive Insurance case here, and I did not quote Justice Markman's concurrence.  So what?  Does that somehow delegitimize the point I was making?  Am I under some obligation to quote Justice Markman?  If so, am I also obligated to quote Justice Marilyn Kelly, who sided with Markey's opinion?  And where is Mr. Vander Ark's defense of Judge Markey?  She claimed then -- and claims now -- to be a rule of law judge, but in Progressive Insurance, she cast aside clear statutory language in favor of a result that comported with her "sense of justice and fair play."  That is not a rule of law methodology; it is the very definition of an empathy judge.  Yet, Mr. Vander Ark says nothing, falling back on the notion that her position is "defensible."  That's a pretty low bar for someone who wants to be a Supreme Court justice.

So, you be the judge.  Have I turned "fiction into fact," as Mr. Vander Ark suggests?  If so, how? What exactly have I written that is incorrect?

Let's make things perfectly clear:  for me, this is not a personal issue.  I favor the rule of law, and I believe strongly, as Bob Young has written, that the "rule of law requires a judge to be subservient to the law itself, not the law to be subservient to the personal views of a judge."

In the cases I have described, Judge Markey has elevated her personal views over the the law.  Whether you agree or disagree with her ultimate decisions, this approach, this decisionmaking process, is not the approach and the process followed by rule of law judges.  That the results are "defensible" is irrelevant -- the rule of law does not concern itself with results, only with faithfully applying the law as written by the People through their elected representatives.

As I have written, Judge Markey seems like a very nice person.  I have no interest in her political donation history or in any of the rumors being circulated about her.  This is not personal; this is about job performance and judicial philosophy, period.

I don't know Mr. Vander Ark.  Is it significant that his email was paid for by Markey's campaign?  I don't think so.  His name is on it, and he will have to defend it, regardless of who wrote it or who paid for it.  His email is wrong and contains numerous factual errors, as I have outlined above, but I will not attempt to smear him as he has attempted to smear me.  Frankly, I have no interest whatsoever in Mr. Vander Ark -- he is not running for anything.  My only interest is in a full and frank discussion of the most important issue in this judicial campaign:  who will be a rule of law justice on the Michigan Supreme Court?

Let's just stick to the issue.  It's not personal.

Upon Further Review: More Problems for Markey

The debate over the O'Brien vs. Markey race for the third GOP Supreme Court nomination has, for the most part, been respectful.  Oh sure, there are the usual hysterics because 20 years ago someone bought a ticket to a colleague's fundraiser, but these are minor and safely ignored.  I like to think of the pro-Markey crowd as best represented by Kevin Rex Heine, who at least does his homework.  [Someday, I'd like to meet Kevin and shake his hand.]  That doesn't mean I agree with him, however.  In fact, the more I study Markey's decisions, the more uncomfortable I am with the thought of her on the high court.

In a recent post, Kevin essentially made this argument:  We don't know much about Colleen O'Brien because she is a circuit court judge, and there have been other judges or nominees, about whom we knew little, who disappointed us, e.g., Harriet Miers, David Souter, and Mary Beth Kelly.  Therefore, we should not nominate Colleen O'Brien in favor of a candidate with a more readily viewable record.

I will address Kevin's observations about Mary Beth Kelly in a near-future article.  At this point, I will only say that Kevin has questioned my writing about two of Jane Markey's decisions when his entire criticism of Mary Beth Kelly is based on one decision, ignoring the many opinions in which she joined with the rule-of-law majority.   Harriet Miers was never confirmed, and Souter was put forth by the moderate northeastern wing of the party (i.e., John Sununu) in response to prior confirmation battles that got out of control due to the flyspecking and nitpicking over productive nominees.

Still, Kevin raises a valid point, but it doesn't carry the day.  He is arguing, in essence, that we should reject an "unknown" circuit court judge in favor of a "known" appellate judge with a troubling record.  That's not an exchange I'm willing to make, for a number of reasons.  First, I do credit endorsements to some extent, particularly by respected and unimpeachable judges such as Chief Justice Robert Young.  Second, I have met and talked to Colleen O'Brien and, frankly, I believe her when she says she is a rule-of-law judge.  Third, as I have detailed here and here, at least some of Judge Markey's opinions don't square with her rule-of-law claims.  Fourth, as I describe below, the decisions I discussed previously are not the only ones that concern me.

In People v Dowdy, a 2010 decision, Markey joined with two Democrat-appointed judges to find that Randall Dowdy, who pleaded guilty in 1984 to kidnapping, five counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, was not required to register with local law enforcement under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), because he happened to be homeless.  SORA expressly states that its purpose is to "better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this state in preventing and protecting against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders" and to "provide law enforcement and the people of this state with an appropriate, comprehensive, and effective means to monitor those people who pose such a potential danger."   Nonetheless, Markey and her Democratic colleagues on the panel found that sex offenders who happen to be (or claim to be) homeless do not have to register with law enforcement because they do not have "the security of a customary place of lodging."

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision (Young, Markman, Kelly, and Zahra in the majority), holding that the Court of Appeals had erred by ignoring longstanding precedent (dating back to at least 1897) that, under Michigan law, every person has a "domicile." Moreover, apart from reporting a residence or domicile, SORA requires every sex offender to report to law enforcement in person four times per year, a requirement that "is unconditional and contains no exceptions or exclusions for homelessness."  The evidence in the case showed that Dowdy failed to report for four years, or 16 quarters.  This requirement was ignored by the Court of Appeals. 

In summary, the Supreme Court found that "the Court of Appeals panel interpreted SORA in a manner contrary to the plainly expressed intent of the Legislature[.]" 

As we have seen, Judge Markey's record includes decisions utterly contrary to the rule of law, in which decisions she has greatly expanded civil liability beyond that intended by the Legislature, ignored clear and unambiguous statutory language in favor of her own feelings as to what constituted "fair play," and, in Dowdy, ignored the clearly expressed intent of a statute in a manner not only contrary to the law but potentially quite harmful to public safety.

The reader may think we don't know enough about Colleen O'Brien, but I suggest we know more than enough about the troubling judicial decisionmaking of Jane Markey.

Being a Judge Means Following the Law, No Matter How Distasteful

Last year's Michigan Supreme Court race featured a fairly clear choice between rule-of-law judges and empathy judges.  The former discern the law and apply it as they find it; the latter rule based on personal whim and feeling, contorting the law to fit their preordained results. 

Sometimes, the rule of law is painful to watch, but it is in these moments when it is most needed.  Judges don't get to make only the easy calls; they have to make tough, occasionally excruciating decisions.  This is the situation that confronted the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Snyder v Phelps, the anxiosly awaited First Amendment case addressing picketing by the Westboro Baptist Church.  The Court issued its opinion today, available here.

Here are the facts, from the case syllabus:

For the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church has picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church’s picketing has also condemned the Catholic Church for scandals involving its clergy. Fred Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishioners (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. The picketing took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in accordance with guidance from local law enforcement officers. The picketers peacefully displayed their signs—stating, e.g., “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “America is Doomed,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “You’re Going to Hell”—for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. Matthew Snyder’s father (Snyder), petitioner here, saw the tops of the picketers’ signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that night.

Snyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters—who participated in the picketing—and the church (collectively Westboro) alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly excessive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District Court reduced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro’s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.

Held: The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

Can there be anything more distasteful and sickening than the hate-filled rants of these Westboro kooks?  Does the First Amendment really protect this bigotry and invective?

No and yes, respectively.

Legally, this turned out not to be even a close question -- the margin on the Court was 8-1, with only Justice Alito dissenting.  One has to concede admiration for Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the majority opinion and who, I am certain, wishes he had been able to lead a unanimous court in this important case.  Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion this way:

Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro’s choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.

Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

Undoubtedly, there will be many who decry this decision and call for, oh, something to be done.  But what?  Congress can pass a law making Westboro's conduct illegal, but such a law would itself be unconstitutional under the principles outlined in the Snyder decision.  

 

The First Amendment makes blogging possible.  Yes, it protects flag burning and Nazi marches, but it also prohibits speech codes and attempts to muzzle a free press and the free expression of ideas that characterizes healthy political discourse. 

 

The Snyder decision is not an endorsement of Westboro or its lamebrained antics; rather, it's a example of the majesty and breadth of the First Amendment and a reminder that the rule of law can be extremely difficult.  It is at these times, at the outer edges of freedom, that we must demonstrate our commitment to the Constitution and the exraordinary framework the Founders gave us.

And we must thank God for the Constitution and pray for all the men and women in our military.  And while we're at it, let's pray for the misguided souls at Westboro, that God may touch their hearts and minds, showing them His way.

Please, Ms. Weaver, Just Retire Already!

Remember the music from Jaws that heralded the shark's return?  I hear that music in my head just before Elizabeth Weaver launches another one of her loony broadsides against the Supreme Court and the process for selecting justices.

The latest is her harebrained idea for choosing justices.  You can find it here.  After taking advantage of the current system for two terms, Ms. Weaver has decided that the entire process has to be scrapped (this will, of course, require that our Constitution be amended).  Her notion is that, instead of party nominations, all Supreme Court candidates would have to file nominating petitions, use public money only, and be elected by district, with the state being divided into seven districts.

Why?  Well, because "people in varying parts of the state look at life in different ways" and all current members of the Court live in "the Detroit/Lansing beltway." 

First, I-96 is not a beltway.  It does not circle Detroit or Lansing.  A corridor?  Maybe, but definitely not a beltway.  Ms. Weaver's incorrect use of the term "beltway" reflects her sloppy thinking while on the Court.  All members of the Court are elected by all of Michigan.  It's not a "Court of Representatives," it's the Michigan Supreme Court, deciding cases for the entire state. 

Second, the Court does not exist to look at life; it exists to render decisions on the law.  "Looking at life" is a hallmark of an empathy court, which makes decisions based on the whim of the moment, not the will of the people as expressed by its legislature and in its Constitution.

In the event of a vacancy, Ms. Weaver channels the following proposal:

•  A 30 to 40-member "Qualifications Commission" would meet and provide two non-binding recommendations to the governor.
• The Commission would be comprised of "all stakeholders in the justice system.  For example, representatives from labor, business, law enforcement, doctors, lawyers, prosecutors, environmental groups, corrections, education, insurance, local government and the like. Each organization would choose its own representative."
• The governor can choose one of the two recommendations, or not.  But, if not, the governor must justify the appointee in writing, "giving written reasons why her or his appointee is the best choice[.]"
• The Senate has 60 days to hold a public hearing on the governor's nomination.  If the Senate takes no action, the appointment becomes effective.  If the Senate rejects the nominee, the whole process starts over again.  If for some reason the process doesn't restart, the vacancy gets filled at the next general election.

Can you imagine the mischief in this system?  How will the Commission be chosen?  Who decides which group represents which segment of "stakeholders in the justice system"?  How long will it take to establish a commission and come up with agreement on two nominees?  How long will vacancies remain open?  It would be a nightmare.

Ms. Weaver also argues for "public scrutiny" of the "inner workings on our Supreme Court."  It's not clear what she means by this, particularly since she also concedes that "there are certain things that must be done at the court in private."  Where does she draw the line?  She never says.  Presumably, since she secretly recorded and then released selected portions of confidential Court deliberations, she values neither confidentiality nor the need for frank and open discussions during case conferences.

The notion of public deliberation may well lead to greater divisions over the Court's decisions. David Stasavage of the London School of Economics did an interesting study of public versus private deliberations in representative democracies.  He concluded in part:

[P]rivate deliberation may, in many instances, actually do more to reduce polarization of opinions in society than will public deliberation. This runs contrary to the common suggestion that public discussions will produce greater social consensus. When members of society have divided opinions about the effects of a policy, if “responsiveness” is the unique equilibrium under public deliberation, then representatives will articulate the opinions of their constituencies, but the public will not actually learn anything from observing public deliberation, because it knows that representatives are simply mirroring the attitudes of their constituents. In contrast, when an “independence” equilibrium prevails, which is more likely to be the case under private deliberation, then even if it does not observe the actions of individual representatives, the public will know that the policy outcome has depended upon the private information held by representatives.  As a consequence, members of the public will be able to draw inferences from the policy outcome, and they will revise their beliefs about which policy outcome is preferable. If beliefs are initially polarized, then they will tend to converge.

It would be a shame if anyone took Ms. Weaver's proposals seriously.  There will be some, of course, but our time would be much better spent if we focus on re-electing the rule-of-law judges currently on the Court and electing rule-of-law judges to all positions in the future.

Ms. Weaver, thank you for your service.  Now, please, go away.

 

Putting "The Rule of Law" in Perspective

This year's Michigan Supreme Court election will spotlight the "Rule of Law" issue. Voters will be asked to decide between Justice Robert Young and Judge Mary Beth Kelly (the Rule of Law judges) and Justice Alton Davis and Judge Denise Langford Morris (the "empathy" judges).

Simply described, RoL judges interpret the constitution, laws, and contracts by the plain meaning of the words used by their authors. Empathy judges, in contrast, interpret the same words in order to reach a desired result.

Here's a perfect example -- Elizabeth Weaver's parting gift to Michigan jurisprudence. The case is Shay v Aldrich, decided August 23, 2010. In short, the plaintiff sued five defendants, alleging that they had assaulted him. Partway through the case, the plaintiff settled with two of the defendants and signed two separate releases, each releasing a defendant "together with all other persons, firms and corporations, from any and all claims, demands and actions which I have now or may have arising out of any and all damages, expenses, and any loss or damage resulting from an incident occurring on September 8, 2004."

After the plaintiff signed these releases, the other defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims, arguing that the plaintiff had waived them. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. finding the releases unambiguous. The Michigan Supreme Court then granted leave to appeal and reinstated the claims against the remaining defendants, finding in a 4-3 opinion by Weaver that the plaintiff did not intend -- despite the clear language of the releases -- to waive any claims against the remaining defendants. The Weaver opinion equated "broad" with "vague" and permits the parties to use extrinsic evidence to introduce ambiguities into a contract, thus necessitating "interpretation" where there previously was none.

The impact of this opinion will not be limited to releases. Why should it be? Why are releases to be treated differently from every other kind of contract? Under the new Weaver rule, a contract means what it was intended to mean, regardless of what it actually says. Under the rule of law, contracts mean what they say, without an interpretive middleman in a black robe.

This Weaverizing of contracts is symptomatic of the elitist arrogance of the ruling class -- they know better than you do what you need and what you really mean. It is this arrogance that leads to Congress passing 3,000 page bills it hasn't read, doesn't understand, and has no intention of reading or understanding. Government power is thereby transferred to the bureaucracy, and the people are left with no option but litigation, hence the constitutional challenge to Obamacare. If we don't have the courts, we are lost.

In the July-August 2010 issue of the American Spectator, Angelo Codevilla published a brilliant article, America's Ruling Class -- And the Perils of Revolution. Please read it here. He describes the ruling class as considering itself "saviors of the planet" and "improvers of humanity." It is a penetrating, brilliant article, which he has expanded to book form.

A portion of Codevilla's article describes the interaction between the ruling class and the courts:

Disregard for the text of laws -- for the dictionary meaning of words and the intentions of those who wrote them -- in favor of the decider's discretion has permeated our ruling class from the Supreme Court to the lowest local agency. Ever since Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in 1920 (Missouri v. Holland) that presidents, Congresses, and judges could not be bound by the U.S. Constitution regarding matters that the people who wrote and ratified it could not have foreseen, it has become conventional wisdom among our ruling class that they may transcend the Constitution while pretending allegiance to it. They began by stretching such constitutional terms as "interstate commerce" and "due process," then transmuting others, e.g., "search and seizure," into "privacy." Thus in 1973 the Supreme Court endowed its invention of "privacy" with a "penumbra" that it deemed "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The court gave no other constitutional reasoning, period. Perfunctory to the point of mockery, this constitutional talk was to reassure the American people that the ruling class was acting within the Constitution's limitations. By the 1990s federal courts were invalidating amendments to state constitutions passed by referenda to secure the "positive rights" they invent, because these expressions of popular will were inconsistent with the constitution they themselves were construing.

By 2010 some in the ruling class felt confident enough to dispense with the charade. Asked what in the Constitution allows Congress and the president to force every American to purchase health insurance, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi replied: "Are you serious? Are you serious?" No surprise then that lower court judges and bureaucrats take liberties with laws, regulations, and contracts. That is why legal words that say you are in the right avail you less in today's America than being on the right side of the persons who decide what they want those words to mean.

As the discretionary powers of officeholders and of their informal entourages have grown, the importance of policy and of law itself is declining, citizenship is becoming vestigial, and the American people become ever more dependent.

So, the battle for the Michigan Supreme Court is not merely a contest for control of the Supreme Court. It is a fight to regain some measure of the rule of law, to maintain a bulwark against the whims of the ruling class and government bureaucracies, and, perhaps most importantly, to assert our independence as free citizens.

If we don't have the authority to govern our own affairs through written agreements, what is left for us?