"Rule of Law" Should Be More Than Just A Slogan

Two years ago, your Wizard opined on the choice Republicans faced between potential Supreme Court nominees Mary Beth Kelly and Jane Markey.  Judge Kelly, of course, is now Justice Kelly, and Judge Markey is trying again, this time squaring off against Oakland County Circuit Court Judge Colleen O'Brien. 

As I wrote in 2010, "Judge Markey stresses her experience on the Court of Appeals. This is obviously a positive quality, but it should not be overstressed to the neglect of the quality of the decisions."  Since then, I have still not had the opportunity to argue before Judge Markey, but I have attended meetings at which she has spoken, and she seems like a nice person.  She describes herself as a "rule of law" judge, and, in a recent email, she stated:

Judge Markey knows that a judge's role is to follow the plain text of our Constitutions and statutes. You can see that for yourself in almost two decades of decisions that demonstrate she is a consistent constitutional conservative. Only appellate court judges, and not state trial court judges, generate open, public, easily accessible, transparent records because their decisions are written and used statewide each day by attorneys and judges in all types of cases. Only Judge Markey has this crucial credential, i.e. proof she adheres to the Rule of Law.  (Emphasis in original). 

Sounds good, right?  Well, in the words of the immortal Lee Corso, not so fast, my friend.  In 2010, I wrote about Allen v Bloomfield Hills School District, which was anything but a "rule of law" decision.  And, unfortunately, since then, I have learned of more examples of Judge Markey's adventures in open field running, untethered by the law.

One of the risks of touting your record is that people might actually read it.

The most glaring example of Judge Markey's departure from the law is her dissent from the majority decision in Progressive Michigan Insurance Company v Smith, a 2010 decision.  In that case, Smith drove his truck across the center line of the road and injured two other people. Since he had too many points on his record and no valid license, Smith had not been able to procure insurance for his truck, so his girlfriend bought it.  Smith was supposed to be excluded from coverage under the policy.  If excluded, the injured persons had no claim against the insurance policy and would be deprived of a potential source of recovery.  If not excluded, the insurance coverage would apply and potentially be available to those injured by Smith's negligence.

There is a Michigan statute directly on point here, MCL 500.3009(2), which states:

If authorized by the insured, automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named person.  Such exclusion shall not be valid unless the following notice is on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the certificate of insurance:  Warning -- when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage is void -- no one is insured.  Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.  (Emphasis added).

So, to exclude a person from coverage, (1) the person must be named as excluded and (2) the specified warning must appear on both (a) the face of the policy or declaration page or policy certificate, and (b) on the certificate of insurance.  In this case, Smith was named as an excluded person and the specified warning appeared on the declaration page, but the warning on the certificate of insurance was not identical to the specified warning -- the last word was "responsible" instead of "liable." 

Thus, the policy did not comply with the clear requirements of the statute, and the Court of Appeals determined that Smith's exclusion was not valid, resulting in coverage for the injured motorists.  This was a 2-1 decision.  Both judges in the majority are of Republican heritage; Judge Markey dissented. 

The majority reasoned:

The Legislature did not merely set forth the substance of the required warning.  Instead, the statute mandates use of "the following notice," which notice is explicitly provided for insurers to use verbatim.  Further the Legislature did not merely state that this notice is required, without specifying the effect of noncomplicance.  If the required warning notice is not provided, the named person "exclusion shall not be valid."  The statute could not be clearer.

 Dissenting, Judge Markey began with words that will echo throughout her campaign, but are belied by numerous opinions she has authored:

I too strongly adhere to the philosophy that it is this Court's function to apply the law as plainly written.  It is not our job to modify, amend, or read into a statute something that is not there; such legislating from the bench is simply improper.  Legislating belongs to the Legislature.

These are laudable sentiments, but they would be more persuasive if Judge Markey did not then immediately violate the philosophy she professes to share.  Judge Markey stated that she would have found the insurance company complied with the statute and excluded coverage for Smith, and she did so under the banner of "common sense":

Must we as strict constructionists abandon "common sense" and render a decision not only remarkably hyper-technical legally but also profoundly unjust and jarring to what I will presume to say is the average person's sense of justice and fair play?  I think not.

It is thus apparent that Judge Markey will apply the rule of law except where she believes it is not consistent with "common sense" or "the average person's sense of justice and fair play."  Under this standard, there is no standard -- she is free to rule as she wishes, without regard to the law, as long as she can fit her ruling under the unlimited umbrella of "common sense" or "fair play." 

The case was appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, but the application ultimately was denied.  Still the denial afforded an opportunity for the justices to weigh in, and the Chief Justice did so, with his customary directness:

The dissenting opinion of Judge Markey in the Court of Appeals, although professing an adherence to the philosophy of interpreting the law as plainly written, nevertheless ignored the statutory language[.]  (Emphasis in original).

The Chief Justice described Judge Markey's opinion as "a shocking departure from the rule of law," and noted:

All Michigan citizens should be extraordinarily troubled by any judge who advances the notion that the rule of law must be enforced unless a judge finds an outcome in a particular case to be one of which he personally disapproves.  In a constitutional republic, judges have no such authority, and the rule of law crumbles where a constitutional, validly enacted mandate can be ignored simply because it offends a judge's sensibilities -- even if on "rare occasion[s]."  (Emphasis in original).

As if that wasn't clear enough, the Chief Justice kept the pedal to the metal:

With all due respect to Judge Markey, our judicial oaths require judges to enforce the Legislature's policy choices, even when we may personally find the outcome in a given case "unjust," "inequitable," "jarring," "hyper-technical," or contrary to what we intuit an "average person's" sensibilities to be.  As this Court has stated, it is a mere "caricature" of judicial restraint for a judge "to assert that her common sense should be allowed to override the language of the statute."  (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).

It's pretty simple -- "rule of law" is a standard to be applied in judicial decision-making.  It embraces the notion that the people speak through the Legislature and that clear and unambiguous statutes -- like the one involved in the Smith case -- are to be enforced as written.

When a judge decides that a statute, despite its clarity, must be interpreted in a way that comports with "common sense" or her notion of "justice and fair play," her opinion becomes unmoored from the law, and the result becomes a function of her feelings.  This removes important, perhaps the most important, characteristics of law itself -- the ability to know what the law is and to rely upon it.

In a just and ordered society, commercial and personal interaction depend upon our ability to rely on others' behavior.  For example, roads and motor vehicles are useless without traffic laws, and without laws enforcing contracts, people cannot rely on their agreements, even if written.  In this way, the rule of law promotes freedom because it produces a common understanding of what the law means and how it applies to us.  In other words, we can play the game because we know the rules. 

In Judge Markey's world, and in the world of the so-called "empathy judges," there really are no rules, since even crystal clear statutes must always pass the "feelings" test, and there will always be cases in which a judge simply doesn't like the result the law compels.  At that point, she resorts to vague notions of "common sense" or her individual concept of "justice and fair play."  A judge taking that approach ceases to apply the law and forfeits her right to proclaim herself a "rule of law judge."  She has instead become simply another legislator, imposing her personal viewpoint on the parties before her and on anyone else affected by her decision.  Her standard for decision-making is no standard at all.

More to come.

 





 

Setting the Record Straight

I recently received an anonymous email criticizing Bill Schuette for certain decisions on the Court of Appeals. The email was so ludicrously awful, I almost deleted it immediately, but then I thought again -- it's an election year, and people who aren't familiar with the law might accept this as some sort of authority. Hence, we set the record straight here, by reposting my emailed response:

I join with Joan Fabiano in condemning this ridiculous attack on Bill Schuette. While everyone has a right to his or her opinion, no one has a right to be wrong on the facts. The anonymous person who attacked Judge Schuette for decisions in three cases involving criminal sentencings clearly does not understand the law or criminal procedure. These decisions show that Judge Schuette understands and applies the law as it is written. Moreover, the anonymous sender completely mischaracterizes the decisions themselves.

Case: People v. Olman, docket no. 268464 (2007)

Facts: The defendant was convicted of sexual assault on a four-year old girl and sentenced to 2-15 years in prison. He appealed his conviction and sentence.

Anonymous said: "Bill Schuette joined with a Granholm appointee (Servitto) and a Blanchard appointee (Jansen) in taking the rare view that the trial court judge actually abused his discretion in applying this sentence and sent the case back for re sentencing more in the range of "at most 12 months in jail, and probation" or a better explanation."

The Truth: The Court of Appeals panel affirmed the conviction and remanded for resentencing. They did not reduce the sentence or order it reduced.

Michigan law provides that a "court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure." Also, "A substantial and compelling reason must be an objective and verifiable reason that keenly or irresistibly grabs the court’s attention, is of considerable worth in deciding the length of a sentence, and exists only in exceptional cases. . .'The court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.'

The trial court had exceeded the sentencing guidelines, and did so based on factors that were already counted in the sentencing. Effectively, the trial court was counting the same factors twice. Under the law, the Court of Appeals had no choice but to remand for resentencing. To do otherwise would have been to do exactly what liberals do -- make up decisions based on their own feelings, not the law.

Case: People v. Prophet, docket no. 278184 (2008)

Facts: The defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct. He was sentenced by the trial court, and the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. After remand, he was given the same sentence he had received originally and he appealed again. The Court of Appeals again remanded for resentencing.

Anonymous said: "Bill Schuette rejected the trial court sentence that was a slight 14-month upward departure from the guidelines because, though the Defendant violated "a position of authority and trust" it was not clear that the Defendant "defendant exercised control over the entire household" which would have allowed for the upward departure."

The Truth: Again, the sentence was a departure from the sentencing guidelines prescribed by law. Departures are allowed, but they must be supported by substantial and compelling reasons. Under Michigan law, "Such reasons must be objective and verifiable, must keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention, and must be of considerable worth in deciding the length of a sentence. They only exist in exceptional cases."

Here, the trial court cited the fact the victim was a child as support for the departure. This factor was already taken into account in scoring the offense under the guidelines and therefore could not be used again. As for the other factors used by the trial court, the appeals court said: "The trial court’s remaining reasons for departure were not objective and verifiable. Although the victim’s mother was supportive of defendant, there was no evidence that she reacted in this manner due to fear of or submission to defendant. Thus, it is not clear that defendant exercised control over the entire household. Moreover, substance abuse was simply never addressed and accordingly, its role or lack thereof is not verifiable. Since these two factors could not properly be relied upon to depart from the minimum guidelines range, the factors adequately taken into account by the guidelines could not be considered, and it is not clear whether the trial court would have departed from the guidelines absent these reasons, this case must therefore be remanded for resentencing."

Again, the appellate panel -- which included Brian Zahra, whose conservative credentials are unimpeachable -- could not have reached any other conclusion. The law dictated the result, not the other way around.

Case: People v. Givhan, docket no. 269500 (2007)

Facts: Defendant was convicted of felon-in-possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm. This was his second trial on these charges, the convictions arising from his first trial having been reversed. Following the second trial, he was given sentences greater than those imposed following his first convictions. The defendant appealed his sentence.

Anonymous said: "Bill Schuette again joined with a Granholm appointee (Servitto) and a Blanchard appointee (Jansen) in overturning the sentence because it was longer than the one given in the first trial and he didn't feel that the trial court judge [sic] enough reason for the second sentence being longer than the first."

The Truth: Michigan law provides that "A presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant is resentenced by the same judge and the second sentence imposed is longer than the first." The US Supreme Court has held: “Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” In order to overcome the presumption of vindictiveness, the trial judge must articulate reasons based on new information for imposing a longer sentence.

In this case, the trial court stated that it was relying on the defendant's history with firearms, but that history was not new. The trial court also said it was basing the increased sentence on the fact that the defendant fired his gun at a woman's house. There was no evidence of this, however. As the court noted: "The prosecutor concedes that no new information was available to the trial court at defendant’s sentencing following his second trial than was available following his first trial. The trial court’s assertion that defendant admitted firing shots at Diane’s house during his second trial was erroneous and therefore could not constitute new information justifying an increased sentence. Accordingly, the trial court’s reasoning did not overcome the presumption of vindictiveness."

This was another decision which complied in every respect with the law. These three cases were not judgment calls, where the decision could have gone one way or the other. The rule of law compelled the Court of Appeals to rule just as they did. To do otherwise would have violated the principles we all hold dear.

There may be reasons to oppose Bill Schuette, just as there may be reasons to oppose Mike Bishop. But the sort of disingenuous slop offered up by the anonymous poster is not reasoned, not logical, and not helpful. Whoever created this, shame on you. We need to condemn these tactics and remember what we are fighting for and why. Anonymous prevarications serve no purpose whatsoever other than to embarass the prevaricators and the candidates they support.

Making Sense of the Michigan Supreme Court Race

Party delegates to the August 28 State Republican Convention will face the formidable tasks of selecting candidates for Secretary of State, Attorney General, and governing boards of Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and one other whose name escapes me (I think it's in the People's Republic of Ann Arbor).

At least as important as these tasks is the responsibility to select two nominees for the Michigan Supreme Court. Justice Robert Young is running for reelection, and he deserves our unanimous, unwavering support. Justice Young is an extraordinary legal talent with a first rate mind, unshakable integrity, and incredible vision.

The other nomination is between Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Mary Beth Kelly and Court of Appeals Judge Jane Markey. Both are well-qualified. So, how does one distinguish them?

Judge Markey stresses her experience on the Court of Appeals. This is obviously a positive quality, but it should not be overstressed to the neglect of the quality of the decisions. Also, Judge Kelly, as the former Chief Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court, was often called upon to sit as an appellate judge, either in appeals from a district court or on motions to recuse her fellow judges. The cases are different, but the process and the decision making are similar.

I have appeared before Judge Kelly on numerous occasions, and I know her from our work together on the State Bar Civil Procedure Committee. She has an excellent mind and judicial temperament. She carefully applies the law as she finds it -- there is no legislating going on from her bench. Given the current tidal wave of reversals emanating from our current Supreme Court, understanding the proper role of a judge is crucial. Mary Beth Kelly gets it, and she lives it every day on the bench.

Although Judge Markey has been on the bench a long time, she sits on the west side of the state, and I cannot recall appearing before her, nor do I recall ever meeting her, so she is something of an unknown quantity to me. Absent this personal contact, I decided to look through some of her published decisions, and I ran across one that made me pause.

In Allen v Bloomfield Hills School District, a 2008 decision, the plaintiff was a train operator who was involved in an accident with a school bus. He sued the school district to recover noneconomic and excess damages under the no-fault act. The circuit court judge granted the school district's motion to dismiss the case. Writing for the 2-1 majority, Judge Markey reversed the trial court and reinstated the case.

The fact that Judge Markey reversed the trial court, in and of itself, means nothing, since there are dozens of reasons why the Court of Appeals would reverse a trial court. It is her reasoning, however, that is troubling.

First, some quick background. The school district is a public entity and therefore enjoys immunity from most tort (personal injury) claims. There is an exception to this immunity for motor vehicle accident claims if the plaintiff suffers "bodily injury." That's the nub of this case.

The plaintiff was operating a train and approaching a crossing at about 65 miles an hour. A school bus tried to drive around the lowered gates, and the train collided with it. It took the train a half-mile to stop, and the plaintiff ran back to the scene of the accident. There were no children on the bus, but the bus driver was severely injured.

So, who sued? The train operator! What for? Post-traumatic stress disorder!

The Supreme Court has previously defined "bodily injury" under the governmental immunity law. In a case called Wesche v Mecosta County Road Commission, the Court held, quite sensibly, that " 'bodily injury' simply means a physical or corporeal injury to the body."

Reversing the trial court in Allen, Judge Markey held that PTSD constitutes "bodily injury." Her conclusion was based on a PET scan of the plaintiff's brain that showed he was "clearly different in brain pattern from any of the normal controls." In other words, the plaintiff witnessed the accident and was so upset by it that his PTSD caused his brain to function differently. The plaintiff's expert psychiatrist testified that PTSD "causes significant changes in brain chemistry, brain function, and brain structure."

There was no evidence of any "physical or corporeal injury to the body." The plaintiff's "injury" was purely psychological, indistinguishable from heartache, depression, or that feeling Michigan fans get after Michigan plays Michigan State in basketball. Whatever the plaintiff had, it was not a "bodily injury," and any discernible effect was not caused by the accident.

The dissenting judge made the point perfectly, quoting from a New Jersey federal decision that assessed, in another context, whether PTSD constituted "bodily injury." The New Jersey district court reasoned:

Given that all human thoughts and emotions are in some fashion connected to brain activity, and therefore at some level "physical," to accept Plaintiffs' argument would be to break down entirely the barrier between emotional and physical harms[.]

This case brings the Supreme Court race into sharp focus. Either we will have a court that believes in and applies the rule of law, enforcing the clear meaning of the laws enacted by the people through their elected representatives, or we will continue to have the kind of court we have now, driven purely by ideology and a desire simply to undo all that was accomplished during the ten years in which the conservatives were in the majority.

Conservatives believe in clear rules and standards so that citizens can rely on the law and behave accordingly, and so that trial courts and the intermediate appellate courts will know what the law means and what is expected. The current majority on the Supreme Court is engaged in a reckless, headlong effort to reverse any decision they don't like, regardless of whether it was rightly decided. Put another way, the current majority's test for a decision's "rightness" is whether they agree with it. Justice and predictability have nothing to do with their approach.

Against this backdrop, the Allen decision is extremely troubling. It reflects an unsettling willingness to disregard clear language in the law in favor of an inexplicable intent to reach a desired result. In Allen, the result drives the law, instead of the other way around.

These are precarious times for the Supreme Court, for Michigan law, and for the citizens of our great state. We cannot afford the result-driven approach of the current Supreme Court majority, and, based on the Allen decision, I am very concerned about Judge Markey's decision making.

Accordingly, for me, it will be Justice Young and Judge Kelly. I hope you will join me.

Getting it Right

From time to time, the courts get it right. Actually, they do so more often than not, but we usually point out only the missteps.

In the case of Citizens for Environmental Inquiry v Department of Environmental Quality, several Michigan citizens and the CEI sued Michigan's Department of Environmental Quality, claiming that the DEQ was required to issue rules regulating carbon dioxide emissions. The plaintiffs alleged that unregulated CO2 emissions cause "global warming and/or climate change" and impose upon "all the people of Michigan a severity of injury that is indivisible and at once a substantial concrete injury personal to every citizen."

The trial court tossed the case out, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on February 9, finding that the DEQ had not done anything wrong, and the plaintiffs had no standing to pursue their claims. Appellate judges Cavanagh, Fitzgerald, and Shapiro got this one right, as did Judge William Collette of the Ingham County Circuit Court.

Ironically, this dismissal happens just as any semblance of a case for anthropogenic global warming seems to be completely unraveling. See here, here, and here.

According to its website, CEI is an organization committed to killing coal-fired and nuclear power plants in Michigan. (Okay, "killing" is my word, not CEI's.) Governor Tinkerbell has done this -- congratulations! After all, why would we want to explore all potential sources of energy? That new "green" economy is working out so well for us here in the Enchanted Mitten -- over 15% unemployment, a real unemployment rate closer to 25%, no prospects for recovery, and a governor who thinks the way to make things better is to -- wait for it -- raise taxes!

Sorry about that last paragraph. This started as a nice positive post about a court making the right decision, so let's end it that way. Good job, Judge Collette! Good job, Judges Cavanagh, Fitzgerald, and Shapiro! Keep up the good work!

Politics and Puffery

We have all experienced puffery, although some may not be familiar with the term itself. "Puffery" is an exaggeration or statement that no reasonable person would take as factual. Typically occurring in advertising and sales, the fact that a statement is not believable means that you cannot sue someone for saying it. For example, "This is greatest car ever made" is an example of puffery, and if you buy the car and discover it isn't the greatest car ever made, you cannot sue over it.

The most common example of puffery besides sales is in resumes and job applications. There was an attorney who left our firm and, applying for other jobs, billed himself as experienced in ERISA transactions. Technically true, but the experience consisted of getting COBRA notices after being canned.

Among resumes and job applications, the worst subset has to be political biographies. These magnify every kid with a lemonade stand into a "job-creating small business owner" and anyone who flips off a light switch into a "green energy activist."

With the 2010 election season beginning to form like a high pressure system over the Rockies, we're going to hear a lot of biographical puffery from candidates.

Gretchen Whitmer? No exception.

Whitmer, the attorney general wannabe, describes her background in part as follows:

Prior to her election to the Michigan House of Representatives, Whitmer was a corporate litigator specializing in administrative and regulatory law with the firm Dickinson Wright in Lansing, Michigan. She practiced administrative law before the Ingham County Circuit Court and the Michigan Public Service Commission.

Sounds pretty good, right? When you look at the facts, not so much.

Whitmer was licensed in November of 1998. She was elected to the House of Representatives in 2000. So, she practiced law for about two years, although much of that time she was campaigning for the House seat.

Whitmer was employed as a lawyer by Dickinson Wright, a large, well-respected, politically heady firm with an office in Lansing. During her first two years out of law school, however, Whitmer was undoubtedly squirreled away in an office somewhere, drafting discovery responses or writing motions and briefs for the attorney who actually went to court and argued. Of course, to figure out how many cases Whitmer appeared on for her clients is a difficult task, since trial court dockets are not searchable by attorney. But we can search a surrogate database -- the Court of Appeals.

A busy attorney ends up in the Court of Appeals, either trying to get a ruling overturned, or trying to keep a judgment intact. The Court of Appeals' records are searchable by attorney, and a search for Whitmer's involvement results in zero -- as in ZEE-ROH -- cases. For contrast purposes, your humble Wizard has had 42 cases in the Court of Appeals, more than most, but far fewer than some. For someone running for attorney general, 42 is a respectable number, but zero is a joke.

Michigan law describes the duties of the attorney general. Primarily:

The attorney general shall prosecute and defend all actions in the supreme court, in which the state shall be interested, or a party; he may, in his discretion, designate one of the assistant attorneys general to be known as the solicitor general, who, under his direction, shall have charge of such causes in the supreme court and shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to him; and the attorney general shall also, when requested by the governor, or either branch of the legislature, and may, when in his own judgment the interests of the state require it, intervene in and appear for the people of this state in any other court or tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the people of this state may be a party or interested.

Clearly, these are significant and important responsibilities. Am I alone in thinking that maybe, just maybe, it's a good idea to have an attorney general who knows where the courthouse is and has actually tried a case or argued one in the Court of Appeals?

When you're selling a car or trying to impress that special someone, puffery is an old and time-honored strategy. Isn't it about time, though, that we demanded more from our elected officials?

Why Judges Matter, Part 1

Many people are aware when the U.S. Supreme Court issues a landmark opinion. Think Roe v Wade or Brown v Board of Education. These decisions are of transcending importance to our national fabric.

What most people are not aware of are the thousands of decisions made every day by lower courts. These decisions have a profound impact on our courts, our businesses, our institutions, and our own responsibility and accountability. These decisions magnify the critical nature of selecting judges to sit on the bench. One such case was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan.

In Gass v Marriott Hotel Services, the Sixth Circuit reinstated a lawsuit filed by two women against Marriott and an exterminating company, in which the women claimed that they were injured by pesticides sprayed in their Maui hotel room after they complained about seeing a dead cockroach.

This case is especially troubling because of the following:

• The two plaintiffs did not seek treatment from a physician specializing in environmental medicine until a month and a half after they returned to Michigan from Hawaii (they did see a general practitioner -- the husband of one of the plaintiffs -- when they got home);
  
  
• The specialist tested the plaintiffs for -- but could not find -- any detectable levels of the chemical compounds found in the pesticide used, and he did not test for any others;
  
  
• An expert toxicologist testified that there has never been any peer review study linking the one pesticide admittedly used to any toxic effect in humans;
  
  
• A renowned clinical psychiatrist testified that the physical symptoms of the two plaintiffs were likely a psychological reaction to stress, and that the plaintiffs had "demonstrated a tendency to react to stress in the past with physical symptoms";
  
  
• There was no evidence that any of the pesticides that potentially could have caused the plaintiffs' problems were used in the hotel room;
  
  
• There was no evidence that the pesticide admittedly used in the hotel room was used in sufficient quantity to cause any problems, nor was there any evidence about the length or intensity of the plaintiffs' exposure, the ventilation, etc., all factors that bear on whether the defendants caused the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.

Thus, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs were actually exposed to any harmful chemicals or that the exposure was at a level that is harmful. As a result, there is no way the plaintiffs could establish that exposure to a chemical actually caused them any harm. Nevertheless, in a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit found there was enough to send the case to trial.

Of course, this result was a foregone conclusion. The majority consisted of Judges Eric Clay and Karen Nelson Moore, both appointed by Bill Clinton, while the dissenter, Chief Judge Danny Boggs, was appointed by President Reagan.

This case and others like it weaken evidentiary requirements, making it easier to file and pursue marginal, even frivolous, lawsuits. This increases the expense of doing business, will drive up insurance costs and prices, and further burden our courts while making it more difficult to get rid of groundless claims.

This is nothing new, of course -- read The Litigation Explosion or anything else by Walter Olson. It illustrates, however, the continuing crisis in our courts, driven by the tension between the rule of law and the political desire to bend (or ignore) the rules to promote a social agenda.

Just another reason why judges -- and votes -- matter.

Welcome!

This is the first post in my continuing quest to dissect and explain the nature of our legal system, what's happening in the courts, and where we're going. My guiding principles are truth and straightforward discussion. Also, I'll occasionally provide updates on my beautiful family.

For background purposes, I am a Michigan attorney. I've been practicing law for over 24 years, both in private practice and as an in-house general counsel. I am married, with two children. Politically, I tend to be conservative, with a substantial independent streak.

Let me hear from you with your questions and comments about current legal and political issues. And thanks for checking in!

Dan.